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COMMENT
THE BRIGHT LINE OF RAPANOS: ANALYZING
THE PLURALITY'S TWO-PART TEST
Taylor Romigh *
INTRODUCTION
Imagine an elderly man who owns forty-five acres of land in northeastern
Ohio. Though he operates only a small family farm, most of the land is
agricultural in nature. One particular area, however, features heavily
saturated soil and high reed-like vegetation, and has been nicknamed "the
swamp." A small creek runs intermittently through the swamp and
eventually empties into the Mahoning River a few miles downstream. Five
years ago, frustrated with what seemed to be the unproductive nature of the
swamp, the man began to plan for its development. The process proved to
be much more complicated than anticipated.
In environmental law terms, the swamp is a wetland, 1 and, as such,
provides ecological services to the surrounding area. 2 As the law stood, it
was unclear whether the man was free to develop this land as he saw fit or
whether this wetland fell within federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water
Act (CWA), thus requiring him to obtain a costly and time-consuming
permit to develop this land.3 Faced with conflicting advice and escalating
costs, the man put his plans on hold, waiting for a clear standard to emerge.
Now, five years later, he would continue to wait.
Controversy has surrounded the extent of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers' (Corps') jurisdiction under the CWA since its enactment. 4 In
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professors Tracy Higgins and Christian Turner for their guidance.
1. According to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, wetlands are lands that are
"inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2006).
2. See generally Patrick Comer et al., NatureServe, Biodiversity Values of
Geographically Isolated Wetlands in the United States 1-2 (2005),
http://www.natureserve.org/library/isolated wetlands_05/isolatedwetlands.pdf.
3. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1377 (2000).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985);
United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Quivira Mining Co. v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 765 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1985); Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir.
1977).
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2001, the Supreme Court limited the Corps' jurisdiction in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(SWANCC). 5 This decision increased litigation and sent CWA litigation
into a "tailspin" 6 due to landowners' increasing willingness to challenge
jurisdiction.7 The U.S. Courts of Appeals disagreed as to whether the
SWANCC decision should be read broadly or narrowly. 8 In 2005, the
Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari in two cases involving the Corps'
jurisdiction over wetlands under the CWA: Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers9 and United States v. Rapanos.'0 While the Supreme Court
sought to resolve the confusion over the extent of the Corps' jurisdiction
under the CWA,I 1 the 4-1-4 decision in Rapanos revealed deep fissures
within the Court and failed to advance a standard to govern in future
challenges.12 Though five Justices agreed on the broad protective rationale
of the CWA, ultimately, five Justices also agreed that the Corps had to do
more to establish why its jurisdiction should extend to the wetlands at
issue. 13 This inquiry seeks to establish a balance between property owners'
rights and protection of the nation's waters, two important interests likely to
instigate further litigation from both sides. 14
When the Supreme Court fails to come to a majority agreement in an
opinion, lower courts are to follow the most narrow holding agreed to by a
majority of the Justices. 15 The standard set forth in Rapanos supports
5. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
6. Robert R. M. Verchick, Toward Normative Rules for Agency Interpretation:
Defining Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 845, 846 (2004).
7. Jonathan May, The Current Status of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction and the Future of
Non-Tidal Wetlands Protection: A Call to Protect 'Isolated Wetlands,' 12 U. Bait. J. Envtl.
L. 127, 128 (2005).
8. Compare Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001) (interpreting
the decision broadly), with United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003)
(interpreting the decision narrowly).
9. 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005).
10. 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414 (2005).
11. See, e.g., Gregory T. Broderick, From Migratory Birds to Migratory Molecules: The
Continuing Battle over the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 30
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 473, 522 (2005) ("With the lower courts in conflict and the political
branches unable to move on this important question [of the extent of Corps' jurisdiction,]
only the Supreme Court can fix the problem.").
12. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2214-66 (2006). Justice Antonin Scalia
wrote for the plurality, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Clarence Thomas
and Samuel Alito, id. at 2214; Justice Anthony Kennedy concurred in the judgment, but not
the plurality's standard, id. at 2236; and Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the dissent,
joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, id. at 2252.
13. See Supreme Court Decisions on Water Resources: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
William W. Buzbee, Professor, Emory Law School).
14. See id.; Erik Stokstad, High Court Asks Army Corps to Measure Value of Wetlands,
312 Science 1870, 1870 (2006).
15. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). While Marks represents the
established precedent, a more recent Supreme Court case implies more flexibility for lower
courts interpreting Supreme Court decisions. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
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jurisdiction when either the plurality's or Justice Anthony Kennedy's test is
met, because the dissent would also grant jurisdiction in such cases. 16
Because Justice Kennedy's approach of requiring a significant nexus
between the water at issue and a traditionally navigable water is seen as the
more inclusive test, it has been, and is likely to remain, the approach most
often invoked by lower courts. 17 Finding a significant nexus, however,
requires a case-by-case determination that places a heavy burden on both
the Corps and courts and offers very little guidance to landowners. 18 More
navigable waters are thus likely to receive discharge or be filled before the
Corps has a chance to prevent it.19 For these reasons, a clear formula
approach is preferable. 20 The plurality offers such a clear formula approach
utilizing two criteria: relative permanence of water flow 2' and a continuous
surface connection with a navigable water. 22 This Comment examines
whether the plurality's test offers an appropriate balance between the
property interests of landowners and the purpose of the CWA "to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters." 2
3
To facilitate examination of the plurality's criteria, Part I provides
background information on the controversy, including the history of the
CWA, prior Supreme Court precedent on the issue, a more in-depth
discussion of Rapanos and its primary opinions, and a brief look at how
lower courts have responded to that decision. Part II provides an in-depth
look at the plurality's two criteria and explores justifications and critiques
of their adoption on the basis of text, precedent, purpose, and scientific
findings. Part III argues that neither of the plurality's criteria should be
more broadly adopted to define the outer limits of the Corps' jurisdiction
under the CWA.
Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2607 (2006) (treating the justiciability of gerrymandering disputes as
undecided despite the failure to gain a majority to reject them as political questions).
16. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006);
N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2006).
18. Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Keith Kisling, National Association of Wheat
Growers).
19. May, supra note 7, at 140.
20. Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Keith Kisling, National Association of Wheat
Growers); id. (statement of Chuck Clayton, Immediate Past President, The Izaak Walton
League of America).
21. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2225.
22. Id. at 2227.
23. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2000).
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I. CONTEXTUALIZING THE PLURALITY'S CRITERIA
A. The Clean Water Act
Congress first passed a statute to protect the nation's waters in the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899.24 The Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act aimed to keep traditionally navigable waterways clear
for interstate commerce. 25 As increasing population and development
strained the nation's waters, Congress passed the Water Pollution Control
Act of 1948.26 In 1972, partly in response to the Cuyahoga River catching
on fire,27 Congress significantly amended the Water Pollution Control Act,
adding what is now commonly known as the Clean Water Act.28 The
adoption of the CWA marked a shift in Congress's focus from regulating
water primarily in the interests of navigation and commerce to placing more
of an emphasis on the environmental effects of pollution.29 Specifically,
the stated purpose of the CWA is "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. ' 30 Toward this
goal, the CWA states that "the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful" unless granted a permit by the Corps.31 Though the
CWA charges the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with broad
administration, the Corps administers the day-to-day operation permit
program, with the EPA retaining ultimate enforcement authority. 32
The CWA uses the phrase "navigable waters," a legal term of art
referring to those waterways that are currently used for interstate commerce
or that have been, or could be, used for such in the future. 33 While the
Corps initially interpreted the term navigable waters traditionally in the
CWA, a district court34 struck down this interpretation as too narrow given
the broad purpose of the CWA and the statutory definition of "navigable
24. 30 Stat. 1121 (1899) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000)).
25. See Broderick, supra note 11, at 478-79.
26. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1387).
27. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174-75 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. Pub. L. No. 90-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1377 (2000)). The Clean Water Act (CWA) has been hailed as one of the United States'
"most successful environmental statutes." Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Sen. Lincoln
Chafee).
29. May, supra note 7, at 140.
30. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2000).
31. Id. § 1311(a).
32. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b); see also Donna M. Downing et al., Navigating Through
Clean Water Act Jurisdiction: A Legal Review, 23 Wetlands 475, 478 (2003); Jeffrey M.
Lovely, Comment, Protecting Wetlands: Consideration of Secondary Social and Economic
Effects by the United States Army Corps of Engineers in Its Wetland Permitting Process, 17
B.C. Envtl. Aft. L. Rev. 647, 660 (1990).
33. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
34. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
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waters"-"the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 35
Following this decision, the Corps broadened its regulatory definition.36 In
its current form, the Corps' regulation states the following:
The term waters of the United States means
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or
may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all
waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,
degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by
industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the
United States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of
this section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves
wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) of this section .... 37
This regulation has instigated much of the controversy around
jurisdiction under the CWA. Over the years, the Corps and the EPA have
made changes to their policies regarding federal jurisdiction under the
CWA to respond to challenges faced in protecting the nation's water
quality. 38 While the textual changes to the regulation have been slight,
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
36. See Downing, supra note 32, at 481.
37. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2006).
38. In 1979, the EPA refined its definition of "waters of the United States" to cover not
only waters used in interstate commerce, but where "the use, degradation or destruction [of
such waters] could affect" interstate commerce. Id. § 328.3(a)(3) (2006); see also National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System; Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854 (June
7, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 115, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 402-03) (discussing the
justifications for the amending the regulations). The Corps and the EPA also attempted to
2007] 3299
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broadening of the Corps' understanding of jurisdiction is much more
expansive. 39 Justice Antonin Scalia refers to this phenomenon as an
"immense expansion of federal regulation of land use that has occurred
under the Clean Water Act-without any change in the governing statute-
during the past five Presidential administrations." 40 By advancing a broad
notion of federal jurisdiction under the CWA, the Corps wields power over
a much larger number of landowners, requiring them to seek the Corps'
permission before developing their land. It is against this background that
the Supreme Court has struggled to interpret the term "navigable waters"
under the CWA.
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court dealt with the question of how to interpret "navigable
waters" in the CWA in order to define the Corps' jurisdiction on two
occasions prior to Rapanos.41  While the decisions came to different
conclusions on their merits, the later case, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, nonetheless affirmed the holding made over fifteen years earlier
in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.4 2
1. Riverside Bayview Homes
Riverside Bayview Homes concerned the attempt to fill "low-lying,
marshy land near the shores of Lake St. Clair in Macomb County,
Michigan. '43 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had determined that the
wetland was not subject to the Corps' authority by interpreting "the Corps'
regulation to exclude from the category of adjacent wetlands-and hence
from that of 'waters of the United States'-wetlands that were not subject
to flooding by adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to support
the growth of aquatic vegetation." 44 The Supreme Court reversed based on
a plain reading of the Corps' regulations to include wetlands saturated by
groundwater (as long as sufficient to support wetland vegetation)-the
wetlands would be subject to the Corps' jurisdiction so long as the
regulation was a permissible interpretation of the CWA.45
exert jurisdiction to the extent of Congress's commerce power by publishing examples of
links to interstate commerce to be used as a basis for CWA jurisdiction. See Downing, supra
note 32, at 483. Reliance on one of these examples, the Migratory Bird Rule, was struck
down in SWANCC. See infra Part I.B.2.
39. See Downing, supra note 32, at 480-83.
40. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2215 (2006).
41. See SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
42. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167-68.
43. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 124.
44. Id. at 125.
45. Id. at 131.
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Applying the Chevron doctrine,46 the Supreme Court explained that the
Corps' regulation is permissible if"it is reasonable, in light of the language,
policies, and legislative history of the [CWA] for the Corps to exercise
jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to but not regularly flooded by rivers,
streams, and other hydrographic features more conventionally identifiable
as 'waters."' 47  Citing the broad, systemic goal of maintaining and
improving water quality, the Supreme Court determined that the Corps'
inclusion of adjacent wetlands in the term "waters" was reasonable because
the wetlands generally "play a key role in protecting and enhancing water
quality."'48 As further evidence of the regulation's reasonableness, the
Supreme Court noted apparent congressional acquiescence to the Corps'
construction because Congress failed to include a limitation of the Corps'
jurisdiction in the 1977 amendments to the CWA despite debate centered
around the issue.49 Though "chary of attributing significance to Congress'
failure to act,"'50 the Supreme Court nonetheless found the omission
sufficient, in combination with the broad purpose of the CWA, to place the
wetlands at issue under the Corps' authority.51
2. SWANCC
In SWANCC, twenty-three suburban cities and villages had purchased a
large parcel of land on which to "develop a disposal site for baled
nonhazardous solid waste." 52 The site had been used to operate a sand and
gravel mining pit until 1960, and the trenches left behind had been grown
over and developed "into a scattering of permanent and seasonal ponds of
varying size ... and depth."' 53 The Corps claimed jurisdiction over these
ponds according to its Migratory Bird Rule, which extended jurisdiction to
waters "[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by
Migratory Bird Treaties" or "by other migratory birds which cross state
lines." 54
Examining precedent, the Court noted that "[i]t was the significant nexus
between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' that informed [their] reading
of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes."55 Finding the Migratory Bird
46. Id. ("An agency's construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to
deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress."
(citing Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984))).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 133.
49. Id. at 136.
50. Id. at 137.
51. Id. at 137-39.
52. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 163 (2001).
53. Id.
54. Migratory Bird Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
328) (clarifying the Corps' definition of navigable waters found at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3
(1986)).
55. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
2007] 3301
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Rule to encroach too closely on the outer extent of Congress's Commerce
Clause power and on traditional state responsibilities, the Court declined to
extend Chevron deference to the Corps' regulations. 56 According to the
Court, though the term "navigable" in the CWA is of "limited import," 57 its
inclusion in the statute places Congress's authority to enact the CWA in "its
traditional jurisdiction over" navigable waters. 58 Because Congress did not
clearly state an intent to reach the extent of the Commerce Clause power or
to "readjust the federal-state balance, '59 the Court found the Migratory Bird
Rule to "exceed[] the authority granted to [the Corps] under § 404(a) of the
CWA." 60
In the aftermath of the SWANCC decision, lower courts disagreed about
the appropriate implementation of its holding.61 The narrow interpretation
of the SWANCC holding, invalidating only the Migratory Bird Rule, allows
jurisdiction based on a hydrological connection between isolated wetlands
and navigable waters.62 Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuit Courts of
Appeals adhered to this interpretation. 63 Conversely, a broad reading of
SWANCC requires a "significant nexus"-more than a hydrological
connection-between the wetlands and navigable waters, 64 possibly as
limited as requiring the body at issue to be "either navigable or directly
adjacent to an open water."65  The Fifth Circuit advanced this view.66
Without either side of this conflict gaining consensus, federal jurisdiction
varied throughout the country67 and called out for clarification from the




Rapanos addressed two consolidated cases concerning four wetlands in
eastern Michigan-three owned by John Rapanos or his affiliates and one
56. Id. at 172-73.
57. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
58. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
59. Id. at 172-74.
60. Id. at 174.
61. See May, supra note 7, at 128.
62. Id. at 153.
63. See United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Deaton,
332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003). At least one commentator argues that these decisions were
based on dicta from earlier Seventh and Ninth Circuit cases "discounting SWANCC."
Broderick, supra note 11, at 498.
64. See May, supra note 7, at 151-52.
65. Broderick, supra note 11, at 514.
66. See Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
67. See May, supra note 7, at 128.
68. See Broderick, supra note 11, at 522.
3302 [Vol. 75
THE BRIGHT LINE OF RAPANOS
owned by June Carabell. 69 Rapanos, despite having his land inspected to
disagreeable results, 70 spent around one million dollars between the three
sites to fill the wetlands and make them more conducive to development. 71
The district court in the Eastern District of Michigan found the wetlands to
be adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters and, therefore, "waters of the
United States." 72  The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the hydrological
connection between the wetlands and a navigable water.73 In contrast,
Carabell sought a permit to dump, fill, and develop his parcel of land into a
number of condominium units. 74 When denied a permit due to the
importance of the ecological function of his property, Carabell brought suit
against the Army Corps of Engineers, also in the Eastern District of
Michigan. 75 The district court found a significant nexus between the
wetlands and nearby Lake St. Clair, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating
that the Carabell wetland was adjacent to a navigable water for purposes of
the CWA.76  Because both cases dealt with the same issue of law-
interpreting "navigable waters" under the CWA-the Supreme Court
consolidated them and filed one decision addressing both.77
2. The Plurality Opinion78
In determining whether the Corps' jurisdiction should extend to the
wetlands at issue, Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality,79 focused his
analysis on two interpretive problems facing the Court: how to interpret
"navigable waters" in the CWA and how to interpret "adjacency" within the
Court's precedent. 80 The answers to these questions became his two-part
69. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2219 (2006).
70. In 1988, John Rapanos had at least one of the parcels, the Salzburg site, inspected by
an official from the Michigan Department of Natural Resources who advised Rapanos that
parts of his land were likely regulated wetlands. Id. at 2238 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Because he was advised that he could develop his land if he delineated and preserved the
wetlands, Rapanos hired a wetland consultant. Id. Reportedly, the results of that
consultation were not to Rapanos's liking, id. at 2238, and he threatened to "destroy" the
consultant and not pay him unless he made the report disappear, id. at 2253 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Because Rapanos had in the past ignored a cease-and-desist letter and an
administrative compliance order, he had been previously convicted of criminal charges under
the Clean Water Act for the same acts at issue in this civil case. See United States v.
Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003).
71. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2253 (Stevens, J., dissenting).






78. Chief Justice Roberts also wrote a concurring opinion in which he criticized the
Corps for not amending its regulations following the SWANCC decision. Id. at 2235-36
(Roberts, C.J., concurring).
79. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas and Alito.
Id. at 2214 (plurality opinion).
80. Id. at 2215-25.
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test for federal jurisdiction over wetlands. First, Justice Scalia addressed
the statutory definition of navigable waters-"waters of the United
States." 81 He began with a dictionary definition of the "waters" to show
that the phrase's plain meaning refers to "continuously present, fixed bodies
of water." 82 He supported this construction by analogizing to the traditional
meaning of navigable waters and also to the use of the phrase
"hydrographic features" in Riverside Bayview Homes.83 Justice Scalia also
argued that statutory construction urged this requirement for navigable
waters by distinguishing between point sources and navigable waters and
delineating channels that tend to run intermittently as point sources.8 4
Finally, Justice Scalia urged an implied requirement of relative permanence
in the term "navigable waters" to promote the statutory policy of preserving
rights and responsibilities traditionally delegated to states, as well as to
adhere to the power delegated to Congress through the Commerce Clause.85
To address his second concern, Justice Scalia turned to the meaning of
"adjacency" within the Corps' regulations. 86  Because the Court in
Riverside Bayview Homes had emphasized the ambiguity in delineating a
boundary around navigable waters with abutting wetlands, Justice Scalia
determined "adjacency" to require a "continuous surface connection"
between the wetland and the navigable water. 87 Though the plurality
opinion proposed a significant curtailment of the Corps' jurisdiction, Justice
Scalia argued that the limitations would not significantly affect the
effectiveness of the CWA due to the record of lower courts regulating
discharges so long as they reach a navigable water. 88 Because the Sixth
Circuit did not analyze the cases according to this two-part test, the
plurality, with Justice Kennedy's concurrence, remanded the cases for
further proceedings. 89
3. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
While in favor of remanding the cases, Justice Kennedy did not agree
with the plurality's two-part test.90 Justice Kennedy found the key to
interpreting navigable waters in text from SWANCC: "It was the significant
nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' that informed our
reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes."91 To elaborate the
meaning of significant nexus, he stated, "wetlands possess the requisite
81. Id. at 2220 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id. at 2221.
83. Id. at 2222 (emphasis omitted).
84. Id. at 2222-23.
85. See id. at 2223-24.
86. Id. at 2225.
87. Id. at 2226.
88. Id. at 2227.
89. Id. at 2235-36.
90. See id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001).
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nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase 'navigable waters,' if the
wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the
region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of other covered waters more readily understood as 'navigable.' 92
Because the lower courts did not use the significant nexus test, but the
established facts did at least imply that standard might be met, Justice
Kennedy cast the fifth and decisive vote to remand the cases for further
consideration. 93
4. The Dissent 94
In contrast, the dissent argued the regulation at issue and its application
in the cases represented a "quintessential example of the Executive's
reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision."95  Justice John Paul
Stevens, writing for the dissent, would have held that Riverside Bayview
Homes controlled in this case.96 In Riverside Bayview Homes, the holding
was not limited to wetlands sharing a continuous surface connection; rather,
the decision acknowledged the Corps' regulation defining "adjacent" to
include those wetlands in "reasonable proximity. '97 Furthermore, the Court
had noted that it was not dispositive that some adjacent wetlands might not
be of great importance to the surrounding waters because it was acceptable
for the regulations to be somewhat overinclusive to ensure that enforcement
would be effective. 98 In extolling the many benefits that wetlands provide
to nearby water systems, Justice Stevens emphasized that the wetlands are
necessary to the proper functioning of a healthy water system.99 Finally,
because the regulation had been in force for thirty years, the dissent argued
that any limitation should come from Congress, not the judiciary.100
5. Implications for Lower Courts
Because the Court was unable to agree on a clarifying standard, lower
courts interpreting Rapanos will generally be left to do as Chief Justice
John Roberts lamented and "feel their way on a case-by-case basis."''
With the dissent favoring a broader jurisdictional grant than either the
92. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. See id. at 2250-52.
94. Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also wrote a dissent in which he urged
the Corps to define the term "significant nexus" in order to avoid "ad hoc determinations that
run the risk of transforming scientific questions into matters of law." Id. at 2266 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
95. Id. at 2252-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 2255.
97. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. See id. at 2256.
99. Id. at 2257.
100. Id. at 2259.
101. Id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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plurality or Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens encouraged lower courts to
uphold jurisdiction whenever either the plurality's two-part test or Justice
Kennedy's significant nexus test were met. 102
The few cases decided since Rapanos illustrate continuing confusion
regarding the extent of the Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA. The
Seventh Circuit remanded United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc. for
further fact-finding toward the significant nexus requirement.10 3 Only one
circuit court has decided a post-Rapanos case on its merits. In Northern
California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, the Ninth Circuit found a
significant nexus between a wetland into which sewage was discharged and
a navigable water, despite lack of surface connection between them,
because the wetland seeped directly into the navigable water. 104
Similarly, district courts have grappled with the standards articulated in
the Rapanos decision. In a Florida case, the court approved of the Corps'
jurisdiction over an intermittent stream because the pollutant would, in
theory, eventually discharge into navigable waters. 10 5 In an opinion critical
of the ambiguity of Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test and laudatory
in its appraisal of the plurality approach, however, a district court in Texas
found no significant nexus where oil spilled into a seasonally dry
streambed. 10 6 The court required evidence that the spill had reached the
navigable waters to which the streambed led.' 0 7
The struggle of lower courts to apply the significant nexus test illustrates
the necessity of providing a clearer standard. Part II analyzes the plurality's
dual requirements of relative permanence and continuous surface
connection to determine their suitability as criteria for the Corps'
jurisdiction under the CWA.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE PLURALITY'S TwO-PART TEST
In crafting a two-part test for federal jurisdiction over wetlands under the
CWA, Justice Scalia, for the plurality, advanced a bright line approach
toward this persistent interpretive problem. 10 8 Adopting any bright line
standard would allow for more consistency and efficiency within the
102. Id. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006).
104. N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2006).
105. United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *21-22
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006).
106. United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 615 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
107. Id.
108. Wetlands: Georgetown Law's Richard Lazarus, Other Experts Examine Supreme
Court Ruling, http://www.eande.tv/transcripts/?date=062206 (last visited Apr. 23, 2007)
[hereinafter Wetlands] (posting a transcript and video of the panel discussion). Interestingly,
at least one commentator has noted that it is possible that the "passionate" tone of Justice
Scalia's opinion may be due to the frustration of having seen very little change since the
SWANCC opinion. See id.
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Corps 10 9 and provide more notice to potentially affected landowners. 110
Clear standards would also avoid the necessity of making the case-by-case
determinations required under Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test. I Il
Indeed, for this reason, Justice Scalia's test may actually make things easier
for the Corps than would Justice Kennedy's test, at least where the two-part
test is satisfied. 112
The plurality's test revolves around two questions: (1) What does
"navigable waters" mean in the CWA?; and (2) What does "adjacent" mean
within the precedent of Riverside Bayview Homes1 13 and the Corps'
regulations that assert federal jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters?114 To answer these questions, the plurality specifically
focused on the issue in each case-jurisdiction over wetlands under the
dredge and fill provision of the CWA. 115 Despite that focus, adopting the
plurality's approach more broadly would have far greater implications-
from the meaning of "navigable waters" and "adjacency" relating to other
sections of the CWA to the effect on jurisdiction under other laws that have
adopted the CWA's "navigable waters" meaning, including the Oil
Pollution Act. 116
No party to either of the consolidated cases promulgated the criteria
advanced by the plurality. 117 Instead, the plurality compiled the factors
from different points in several amicus briefs. "8 While this point, by itself,
does not speak to the legitimacy of the factors set forth, such a practice is
somewhat unusual. 119 Furthermore, a judicially created rule may be
particularly problematic when addressing a technical issue. 120
In the following analysis, this Comment examines the bright line
approach promulgated by the plurality in order to determine whether it
109. See Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Jonathan H. Adler, Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law).
110. Id. (statement of Keith Kisling, National Association of Wheat Growers).
111. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Although Justice Kennedy does suggest that more specific regulations by the Corps would
allow broader categorization so that case-by-case determinations would not be necessary, at
least until those regulations are enacted, case-by-case determination is required. Wetlands,
supra note 108.
112. Wetlands, supra note 108.
113. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985).
114. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220-25.
115. Id. at2215.
116. See Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001) (using CWA
jurisprudence to determine jurisdiction under the Oil Pollution Act); see also Hearing, supra
note 13 (statement of Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton) (recognizing the importance of defining
"the waters of the United States" due to the broad application of the term).
117. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2259 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Delay Could Give EPA Time to Win Court Support for Dual Water Test, Water Pol'y
Rep. (Inside Wash. Publishers, Arlington, Va.), Sept. 27, 2006, at 1, 2.
119. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2259 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. See Carey Schmidt, Private Wetlands and Public Values: "Navigable Waters" and
the Significant Nexus Test Under the Clean Water Act, 26 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.
97, 111 (2005) ("Judges are typically too busy to adequately self-educate themselves on
esoteric matters like wetland science."); Wetlands, supra note 108.
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should be more broadly adopted by Congress, the Corps, or the Supreme
Court as the standard for federal jurisdiction under the CWA. Because of
its limited focus, this Comment does not deal directly with questions of
proper agency deference and instead assumes that the plurality correctly
declined to extend Chevron deference to the Corps' regulations in Rapanos.
While contestable, 121 this assumption facilitates the discussion by focusing
exclusively on the merits of the standards advanced.
Because the major questions of Rapanos revolve around the
interpretation of the CWA, classic statutory interpretation methods informs
the bulk of the analysis of the plurality's two-part test. Part II.A examines
the first of the plurality's criteria, relative permanence, while Part II.B
examines the second, continuous surface connection. For each criterion,
support for and criticism of the requirements are drawn from the text and
structure of the statute, precedent, and the CWA's purpose and history. The
remainder of the analysis takes a more scientific approach in asking how
adoption of each requirement impacts the realization of the environmental
purpose at the heart of the CWA.
A. Relatively Permanent Bodies
Both the Corps' regulations and Supreme Court precedent establish that
wetlands adjacent to "waters of the United States" qualify as navigable
waters under the CWA. 122 In Rapanos, a threshold question required
determining whether the channels, to which the wetlands at issue were
(presumably) adjacent, were themselves "waters of the United States." 123
For the plurality, a necessary implication of the term "navigable waters"
within the CWA limits its application to "relatively permanent, standing or
continuously flowing bodies of water forming geographic features that are
described in ordinary parlance as streams[,] .. , oceans, rivers, [and]
lakes."' 124  Specifically, the plurality considers intermittent1 25  or
ephemera 1 26 streams problematic and explicitly excludes desert washes and
arroyos as the most implausible candidates for status as navigable waters. 127
Seasonal streams, though technically intermittent, would qualify as
121. See, e.g., Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2262 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 129 (1985); 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7) (2006) (emphasis omitted).
123. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220-25.
124. Id. at 2225 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
125. An intermittent stream flows only at certain times of the year or only in certain
lengths of its channel but not others. See Robert E. Beck, Water and Coal Mining in
Appalachia: Applying the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and the
Clean Water Act, 106 W. Va. L. Rev. 629, 678 n.324 (2004); Robert Jerome Glennon &
Thomas Maddock III, In Search of Subflow: Arizona's Futile Effort to Separate
Groundwater from Surface Water, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 567, 574 n.56 (1994).
126. An ephemeral stream "flows in direct response to precipitation." Beck, supra note
125, at 678 n.325 (citing Bureau of Mines, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, A Dictionary of
Mining, Mineral, and Related Terms 806 (Paul W. Thrush et al. eds., 1968)); see also
Glennon & Maddock, supra note 125, at 574 n.57.
127. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2222.
[Vol. 753308
THE BRIGHT LINE OF RAPANOS
navigable waters so long as they flow continuously "some months of the
year."128
In analyzing the plurality's requirement of relative permanence, this
Comment first explores support and then criticisms of such a requirement.
While much of the discussion focuses on the rationales advanced by the
Supreme Court Justices in their opinions, other perspectives, particularly
addressing scientific findings and consequences, are introduced to achieve a
more comprehensive consideration of the advisability of requiring
navigable waters to be relatively permanent bodies.
1. Why Require Relative Permanence?
Though not advanced by the parties, a requirement of relative
permanence gained favor with the plurality.129 This section offers support
for requiring navigable waters to be relatively permanent bodies from both
interpretive and scientific standpoints.
a. Interpretive Arguments
In interpreting a statute, logic demands beginning with the text.130
Unfortunately, legislatures are rarely able to enact statutes susceptible to
only one reading. 131 Instead, judges often use other methods to determine
proper statutory interpretation. 132 Because the CWA defines "navigable
waters" as "waters of the United States," the term extends to more than
traditionally navigable waters, but the exact extent of this expansion is
ambiguous. 133 The plurality in Rapanos interpreted "navigable waters" to
imply a relative permanence requirement. 134 This section analyzes the
plurality's interpretation using techniques that focus on the CWA's text and
structure, precedent on the issue, and the purpose and history of the CWA.
While not offering an exhaustive interpretational analysis, this discussion
enables consideration of a broad range of issues relevant to the CWA's
interpretation.
i. Text and Structure
Congress provided the starting point for the interpretation of "navigable
waters" by including a statutory definition within the CWA: "The term
'navigable waters' means the waters of the United States, including the
128. Id. at 2221 n.5.
129. Id. at 2225.
130. See Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and the
Legislative Process 9 (1997).
131. See Verchick, supra note 6, at 851 (articulating political controversy and ensuring
flexibility to address unforeseen circumstances as reasons for statutory ambiguity).
132. See Mikva & Lane, supra note 130, at 50 (delineating a traditional interpretive
approach).
133. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
134. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2225.
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territorial seas." 135  Based on this definition, all nine Supreme Court
Justices agree that "navigable waters" within the CWA includes more than
traditional navigable waters. 136 While Riverside Bayview Homes dismissed
the adjective "navigable" as having "limited import" within the CWA, 137
the SWANCC decision clarified that "navigable" nonetheless carried
meaning by creating a reference point for jurisdiction. 138 The statutory
definition for "navigable waters," "the waters of the United States," features
a definite article with the plural form of water. 139 Because water qua water
is not easily separated into multiple units, 140 this construction implies that
the definition refers to more discrete entities than the general noun water. 141
In this form, waters means "the water occupying or flowing in a particular
bed."'142 A body fits within the definition of "the waters" only if it contains
water. Common sense suggests that referring to a seemingly dry area of
land as part of "the waters" is, at least, problematic. 143
Turning to the structure of the text, the CWA prohibits "addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." 144 This construction
separates point sources and navigable waters into two distinct groups. 145
For this reason, the definition of point source within the statute may shed
light on the meaning of navigable waters. 146 The CWA defines a point
source as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but
not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete
fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or
vessel or other floating craft." 147  In general, the types of conveyances
enumerated as point sources may be expected to feature intermittent
flows. 148 Likewise, some, such as a channel or ditch, might presumably be
called by a different name if they flowed more continuously. 149 The
135. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
136. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220; id. at 2241 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2255
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133.
138. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001).
139. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
140. Most commonly, multiples involving water as water would require a constraining
element (for example, glasses of water, drops of water, etc.).
141. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220.
142. Webster's Third International Dictionary 2581 (1986). Justice Scalia referred to this
definition: "' [a]s found in streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans,
rivers, [and] lakes,' or 'the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such
streams or bodies."' Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Webster's New International
Dictionary 2882 (2d ed. 1954)). Justice Kennedy offers a further option from the same
dictionary, allowing for impermanent occurrences: 'flood or inundation."' Id. at 2242
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary, supra, at 2882).
143. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2222 (appealing to common sense in distinguishing
intermittent and ephemeral streams from navigable waters).
144. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
145. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2223.
146. Id. at 2222-23.
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
148. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2222.
149. Id. at 2223 n.7.
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inclusion of intermittent conveyances, like ditches, in the definition of point
sources, and the inclusion of more permanent bodies, like seas, as navigable
waters creates a structural inference that frequency or duration of water
flow may have bearing on classification of a particular body as one or the
other. 150
While the text and structure of the CWA may not offer a plain meaning
capable of clear interpretation for the term navigable waters, it may
nonetheless provide enough information to determine that certain bodies
fall outside of federal jurisdiction.' 5 1 If bodies that are dry for the majority
of a year may not reasonably be termed "waters," the text and structure of
the CWA supports requiring navigable waters to be relatively permanent.
ii. Precedent
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of permanence in
navigable waters. 152 The facts of the previous cases did not involve an
intermittent connection to navigable waters, so the occasion to address this
issue did not arise. 153 Despite being decided on other issues, however,
Riverside Bayview Homes and SWANCC may offer implicit support for
requiring navigable waters to be relatively permanent. In Rapanos, the
Court relied on Riverside Bayview Homes, acknowledging that "waters of
the United States . . . referred primarily to rivers, streams, and other
hydrographic features more conventionally identifiable as 'waters."' 154
Presumably, such hydrographic features would necessarily contain water on
a relatively permanent basis. Similarly, both SWANCC and Riverside
Bayview Homes used the term "open water" when referring to navigable
waters. 155 The First Circuit has read this language as distinguishing
between "rivers, lakes, streams, and similar bodies of water" and
"intermediate forms of partially wet, partially dry areas, i.e. wetlands,
and... dry land."'156 If one reads the "partially wet, partially dry" language
of the First Circuit to describe an intermittent stream channel during
different parts of the year, this interpretation provides support for the
assertion that "open water" requires a relatively permanent presence of
water. Likewise, at least one district court has ruled that statutory
150. See id. at 2222-23.
151. See United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex.
2006) ("Thus, the plurality looked to the statutory wording of the CWA and gave it its plain
and literal meaning-a constructionist viewpoint.").
152. See generally SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001);
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
153. Riverside Bayview Homes featured a wetland that abutted a traditionally navigable
water. 474 U.S. at 131. SWANCC, on the other hand, concerned geographically isolated
ponds with no connection to navigable waters. 531 U.S. at 163.
154. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2222 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id.
156. United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 157, 169 (1st Cir. 2006).
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construction would not allow inclusion of an ephemeral stream as a
navigable water. 157
Though none of the precedent discussed in this section would bind the
Supreme Court, it may be used to support a determination that relative
permanence is required. 158 The excerpts and examples outlined above
support requiring navigable waters to be relatively permanent by showing
how the requirement is consistent with both prior Supreme Court precedent
and lower court interpretations.159
iii. Purpose and History
The CWA's purpose, "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters," 160 is immensely broad. In fact,
throughout the enactment proceedings, the CWA was described as a
comprehensive scheme broadly addressing issues of water quality. 16 1 Many
assumed, at least until the ruling in SWANCC, that Congress granted
jurisdiction to the Corps to the extent of its power under the Commerce
Clause. 162 In contrast, the second paragraph of the goals and policy section
of the CWA states,
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources,
and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority
under this chapter.1 63
To the extent that the CWA limits what private landowners may do with
their land designated as navigable waters, it functions as a land use
restriction. 164 Because land use restrictions are typically within the domain
of the states, the further the Corps' jurisdiction is extended under the CWA,
the further it encroaches on a "primary responsibility" of the state. 165
Unquestionably, the CWA would cover much more land area if intermittent
157. See United States v. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 780, 788 (E.D. Va. 2002).
158. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2222.
159. See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
160. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2000).
161. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132-33 (1985).
162. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C.
1975); Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Sen. Lincoln Chafee) (quoting the 1972
conference report that the CWA was to get "the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation" (internal quotation marks omitted)). In SWANCC, the Court refused to grant
Chevron deference to the Corps' regulations because they came too close to the outer bounds
of Congress's commerce power. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172. Likewise, the Court in Rapanos
refused to grant the Corps deference due to the limits of the commerce power. 126 S. Ct. at
2224.
163. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
164. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2224; Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Sen. James
M. Inhofe).
165. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
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and ephemeral streams were included as navigable waters than if they were
not. 166 Because much of this land is privately owned, 167 some argue that
states' rights should weigh on balance to exclude these occasionally
flowing bodies in order for the statute to adhere to its policy of preserving
states' rights. 168
No legislative action has been taken to rein in the Corps' asserted
jurisdiction, although such amendments have been proposed. 169 Courts
generally hesitate to infer too much from the defeat of any legislative
proposal, however, because individual members of Congress may have
unrelated reasons for opposing a bill. 170 Further, courts must interpret the
intention of the enacting Congress, manifested in the words and structure of
the CWA, not a later Congress's interpretation of the statute. 17'
Following the SWANCC decision, the Corps published an Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in the Federal Register seeking
comments on whether and how its regulations should change in response to
SWANCC. 172 A draft version of the new regulations would have required
''continuous flow" for a body to be covered as a navigable water under the
CWA; however, the Corps never adopted the new regulations. 173 Though
included here as administrative history of the CWA, the Corps'
consideration of a continuous flow requirement advances the notion that
SWANCC implicitly supports this requirement. 174 Though the draft rule
was ultimately not adopted, supporters of this provision could easily point
to other political factors to explain its demise. 175
Having considered a broad range of interpretive arguments for requiring
navigable waters to be relatively permanent, the next section takes a more
practical approach in exploring some of the scientific bases for this
requirement.
b. Scientific Arguments
The extent to which requiring navigable waters to be relatively
permanent will affect the purpose of the CWA is largely a scientific
166. Sixty percent of stream length in the United States is intermittent and ephemeral. See
infra note 177 and accompanying text.
167. Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Keith Kisling, National Association of Wheat
Growers) ("Approximately 70% of the land in the lower 48 States is owned privately.").
168. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2223.
169. See SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 169-70 (2001).
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2003).
173. See Verchick, supra note 6, at 873-75.
174. See id. at 869 (discussing the procedure between SWANCC and the drafted rule).
175. While a large number of comments were received against limiting jurisdiction, it is
generally thought that President George W. Bush was initially supportive of a restriction on
jurisdiction, but changed his mind after a meeting with representatives from Ducks
Unlimited, a wetlands conservation group that includes many hunters. Id. at 869 n. 149.
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question. Analyzing scientific findings regarding intermittent and
ephemeral streams offers some answers. Though the plurality's notion of
relative permanence remains somewhat indeterminate with regards to
intermittent streams, it clearly excludes ephemeral streams, washes, and
arroyos from federal jurisdiction. 176
Around 60% of stream length in the United States carries an intermittent
or ephemeral flow. 17 7 This percentage is even higher in the west, where 80-
90% of streams flow only seasonally or after a hard rain. 178 While these
numbers illustrate the significance of decisions made affecting these
channels, they also illustrate the vast amounts of land that would be subject
to the Corps' jurisdiction if intermittent and ephemeral streams were
included as navigable waters.179 Since the CWA seeks to preserve states'
rights while protecting water quality, limiting jurisdiction based on
permanence of water flow imposes a limitation on federal jurisdiction that
would further this policy. '8 0
Excluding intermittent and ephemeral streams from federal jurisdiction
under the CWA does not leave them unprotected. In accordance with their
traditional rights to enact land use restrictions, states may regulate these
channels if they find it advisable to do so.181 That most states currently do
not regulate intermittent and ephemeral channels should not be understood
to reflect accurately their inability to enact such restrictions. 182 In contrast,
states have had little incentive to enact their own protections of these
channels because the federal government has insisted that it can take care of
it all.' 83 State initiatives, be they regulations or grassroots conservation
efforts, may even protect intermittent and ephemeral streams more
effectively than federal regulation because they can be more efficient and
localized. ' 84
Pollutant discharges made into intermittent or ephemeral streams may
still be regulated under the CWA, even if these channels are excluded from
navigable water status, as long as the pollutants eventually reach navigable
176. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2221-22.
177. See Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Chuck Clayton, Immediate Past President,
The Izaak Walton League of America); see also Clean Water Restoration Act of 2005, H.R.
1356, 109th Cong. § 3(7) (2005).
178. See Verchick, supra note 6, at 875.
179. See Joshua L. Lee, Note, Federal Wetland Jurisdiction and the Power to Regulate
Commerce: Searching for the Nexus in Gerke Excavating, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 263, 289
(noting the double-edged nature of this argument because it cuts both ways).
180. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2223-24.
181. See Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Jonathan H. Adler, Professor, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law).
182. See id. (statement of Sen. James M. Inhofe).
183. See id.
184. See id. (statement of Jonathan H. Adler, Professor, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law) ("Private landowners... are far more willing to cooperate with conservation
organizations and government agencies when doing so does not increase the threat of federal
regulation.").
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waters. 185 Because relative permanence affects only classification as a
navigable water, and not as a point source, intermittent or ephemeral
streams may be point sources if they convey pollutants to a navigable
water. 186 Lower court precedent confirms this method of regulation. 187 In
this way, the CWA furthers its goal of improving water quality without
infringing on either states' or landowners' rights by asserting jurisdiction
over a large classification of land that may not significantly affect water
quality. 188 If a substance cannot be detected by the time it reaches a
navigable water, it ceases to be a pollutant. 189
To the plurality and other proponents, requiring navigable waters to be
relatively permanent represents a helpful bright line standard that promotes
the purpose of the CWA while imposing a limitation, inferred from the text
and structure of the statute, which will prevent federal infringement on
states' and landowners' rights. 190 The following section explores criticisms
of the proposed requirement.
2. Why Not Require Relative Permanence?
Justice Kennedy, along with the four dissenting Justices in Rapanos,
criticized the plurality's promulgation of requiring navigable waters to be
relatively permanent. 191 This section explores why relative permanence
may not provide an appropriate bright line standard for jurisdiction under
the CWA by responding to arguments in support of the requirement and
introducing further considerations.
a. Interpretive Arguments
The subjective nature of interpretation renders most texts and laws
susceptible to more than one reasonable reading. As with the section
supporting the requirement, this section explores arguments against
requiring navigable waters to be relatively permanent on the bases of the
text and structure of the CWA, precedent on the issue, and the CWA's
history and purpose.
185. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2227.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 2224 n.9 (responding to Justice Kennedy's assertion that the plurality's test
is both overinclusive and underinclusive).
189. See James W. Hayman, Comment, -Regulating Point-Source Discharges to
Groundwater Hydrologically Connected to Navigable Waters: An Unresolved Question of
Environmental Protection Agency Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 5 Barry L. Rev. 95,
124 (2005) (discussing a similar dilution process of groundwater).
190. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2224 n.9.
191. Id. at 2242 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2256 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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i. Text and Structure
While the use of "the waters" in the CWA and its definition 192 illustrates
that the CWA does not cover particles of water in general, they do not
clearly establish that the flow or presence of water must be relatively
permanent to fit within the meaning of waters. No definition of waters
explicitly requires permanent water presence. 193 The inclusion of streams
in the enumerated list may even imply otherwise since ephemeral and
intermittent streams are nonetheless streams.194 Though use of the term
"waters" does not require inclusion of intermittent or ephemeral streams, it
does not prohibit their inclusion. The plurality appeals to common sense to
build this inference; 195 however, it is not clear that common sense supports
this conclusion. 196  While further parsing of textual distinctions is
possible, 197 such semantic dissection may not arrive at the best
interpretation of text enacted for general applicability. 198
As to the structural argument advanced above, reliance on the definition
of a point source may be misplaced. 199 The definition of point source
within the CWA does not explicitly address permanence of flow, so a
requirement of intermittency goes beyond the text of the statute.200 In
addition, though two distinct groups, recognizing an intermittency
requirement for point sources might not create the negative inference of a
permanence requirement for navigable waters. 20 1 This analysis suggests
that the inference drawn by the plurality may actually be multiple layers of
inferences. 20 2 Even if the plurality's observations about the nature of point
sources were correct, reducing that generality to a rule may ignore other
relevant features of the streams. For instance, all intermittent streams
would be excluded from navigable water status regardless of their
proximity to traditional navigable waters or volume when flowing.20 3
Calling a streambed a channel (or point source) while dry and a stream
(or navigable water) while flowing would cause the Corps' jurisdiction to
fluctuate depending on precipitation and time of year.204 Such distinctions
are impractical and reinforce the necessity of choosing whether to protect
192. See supra Part II.A.l.a.i.
193. See Webster's Third International Dictionary 2581 (1986).
194. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2260 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 2221 n.5 (plurality opinion).
196. Id. at 2260 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 2221-22 (plurality opinion).
198. See id. at 2261 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Referring to the plurality's point
source distinctions, Justice Stevens writes, "The plurality's attempt to achieve its desired
outcome by redefining terms does no credit to lexicography-let alone to justice." Id.
199. Id. at 2260-61.
200. Id. at 2260.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 2261 n.12 (criticizing the plurality for redefining terms to fit its
objectives).
203. See id. at 2242 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
204. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
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the dry channel or allow the stream to fall outside of federal regulation.
While a weak rationale possibly exists within the text and structure of the
CWA for navigable waters to be relatively permanent, 205 this requirement
may not be a necessary interpretation of either the text or structure of the
statute.
ii. Precedent
Much like the earlier definition of "waters," 20 6 the quotes from Riverside
Bayview Homes and SWANCC reinforce the idea of discrete bodies of
water,207 but, if one allows that streams may be intermittent or ephemeral,
they may not resolve the issue of permanence. The First Circuit's
explanation for the Supreme Court's use of the term "open waters" may be
read not to support a relative permanence requirement. 208 By providing the
example of wetlands, the First Circuit may have been describing lands that
are wet and dry at the same time, saying nothing about the permanence of
water flow.209 Even if Riverside Bayview Homes and SWANCC implied, by
using the phrase "open water,"210 that a navigable body must be relatively
permanent, such implication would not create a binding precedent because
the facts of those cases did not require such a determination. 211
Support for a permanence requirement from the lower courts, which have
been interpreting the CWA for thirty years, would be telling, even though,
as previously stated, lower court rulings are not binding on the Supreme
Court. In contrast, most courts have found that intermittent and ephemeral
streams are within the Corps' jurisdiction.212 While these courts generally
extended Chevron deference to the Corps' regulations, which explicitly
include intermittent streams, their acceptance of this regulation when it had
direct bearing on a case means that it at least passed the reasonability
requirement of Chevron. Though not creating a binding precedent, such a
consensus among lower courts counsels against instituting a relative
permanence requirement for navigable waters.
205. See supra notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
208. See United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 157, 169 (1st Cir. 2006) ("It is clear from this
language that the Riverside court uses 'open water' descriptively to distinguish rivers, lakes,
streams, and similar bodies of water from those intermediate forms of partially wet, partially
dry areas, i.e. wetlands, and from dry land.").
209. See id.
210. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001); United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985).
211. See supra note 153.
212. See, e.g., Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2005);
Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407, 417 (4th Cir. 2003); Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration
of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2002); Headwaters, Inc.
v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2001); Quivira Mining Co. v. U.S.
EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lamplight Equestrian Ctr., Inc.,
No. 00-C-6486, 2002 WL 360652, at *7 (N.D. 11. Mar. 8, 2002).
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iii. Purpose and History
Though the extent of Congress's grant of authority may be debated,
regulation of intermittent and ephemeral streams fits within the broad
purpose of the CWA.213 The statute does, however, contain a policy to
preserve states' rights.214 Because any jurisdiction under the CWA could
be understood as infringing on states' rights, the question would be whether
regulating intermittent and ephemeral streams somehow crosses a line by
intruding too far into states' affairs. 215 One might also question whether
drawing the line, as the plurality does, between relatively permanent and
intermittent streams is arbitrary when concerned with states' rights.216 The
answers to these questions depend on the degree to which excluding
intermittent and ephemeral streams would impair the primary goal of the
statute compared to the added infringement on states' rights, because
Congress presumably did not intend the CWA's policy of protecting states'
rights to undermine its primary purpose. 217
In 1977, Congress amended the CWA.218 Despite significant debate on
the extent of the Corps' jurisdiction prior to the amendments, Congress did
not act to rein in the existing regulations. 219 The Supreme Court, in
Riverside Bayview Homes, emphasized Congress's acquiescence to the
Corps' regulations in granting them deference.220  Though courts are
hesitant to infer too much from Congress's failure to act, the length of time
the statute and regulations have been in place coupled with the passed
opportunity for change may facilitate an inference of congressional
acquiescence. 22 1
In terms of administrative history, the regulations at issue have remained
largely unchanged since 1977.222 Over nearly thirty years, neither Congress
nor any of the five presidential administrations that have presided in the
interim have acted to rein in the Corps' jurisdiction. 223 Though that nearly
changed following SWANCC, the ultimate rejection of the drafted rule
renders its support for a requirement of relative permanence marginal. 224
213. See Verchick, supra note 6, at 875 (denying the ecological or scientific rationale for
distinguishing between perennial and intermittent streams).
214. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(b) (2000).
215. Another view would question whether an analogy to land use restrictions is correct
where the benefits of an action on land would be local, but the costs imposed would be
external. See May, supra note 7, at 161.
216. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2246 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 2261 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135-36 (1985).
219. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
220. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 136.
221. See id. at 136-38.
222. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2255, 2259 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. See id. at 2259.
224. See Verchick, supra note 6, at 869-70.
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b. Scientific Arguments
Intermittent and ephemeral streams serve a wide variety of functions. 225
The frequency and speed of flow and the surrounding environment affect
the types of functions that any individual intermittent or ephemeral stream
may serve. 226 Because intermittent and ephemeral streams tend to flow
slowly, they may perform certain water quality control functions better than
perennial streams. 227 A slower flow allows silt to settle in the streambed,
delivering clear water downstream where the silt would otherwise degrade
aquatic habitat.228 Possibly more important in terms of combating water
pollution, the slow flow of intermittent or ephemeral streams allows more
time for microbes to convert hazardous chemicals to prevent algae
blooms, 229 as well as other "nutrient reduction functions." 230 Intermittent,
and to some extent ephemeral, streams also support wildlife and vegetation
in a number of ways, which supports another policy goal of the CWA.23!
Additionally, they play an important role to humans and wildlife by
providing invaluable flood control functions.232 By providing a place for
water to go when inundation occurs, intermittent and ephemeral streams
perform a buffering function that helps to minimize flooding destruction.233
Interestingly, though perhaps not surprisingly, the water needs created by
development have contributed to a large number of western streams being
diminished to a nonconstant flow from their original perennial states. 234
The sheer volume of stream length that would be affected by adoption of
the plurality's requirement illustrates that the issue is significant. 235
225. Leslie M. Reid & Robert R. Ziemer, U.S. Dep't of Agric. Forest Serv., Evaluating
the Biological Significance of Intermittent Streams (1994),
http://www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/reid/2IntermitStr.htm.
226. See id.
227. See Stokstad, supra note 14, at 1870.
228. See id. Likewise, a slower flow allows for a prolonged dispersal of sources of
nutrients to downstream riparian areas. See Reid & Ziemer, supra note 225.
229. Stokstad, supra note 14, at 1870.
230. See N.C. Div. of Water Quality, The Value of Intermittent Streams in North
Carolina: A Summary 1 (Mar. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.aswm.org/fwp/summary-ofintermittent-streams-in-nc.pdf.
231. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2000) (articulating that "it is the national goal that wherever
attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection and propagation
of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water"). Intermittent
and ephemeral streams provide a water source in arid regions and a habitat refuge for
vulnerable wildlife. Glennon & Maddock, supra note 125, at 581; Reid & Ziemer, supra
note 225.
232. Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Chuck Clayton, Immediate Past President, The
Izaak Walton League of America).
233. Brian Knutsen, Asserting Clean Water Act Jurisdiction over Isolated Waters: What
Happens After the SWANCC Decision, 10 Alb. L. Envtl. Outlook J. 155, 184 (2005).
Between 1990 and 1999, flooding was the most commonly declared natural disaster. Id.
234. See Glennon & Maddock, supra note 125, at 567.
235. See Lee, supra note 179, at 289 (discussing the same principle concerning wetlands).
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When flowing, intermittent and ephemeral streams carry pollutants
downstream as would a perennial stream.236 Likewise, if ephemeral or
intermittent streams are allowed to be filled over, the important functions
they serve to water quality, wildlife, and flood control may be lost.237 Even
minor alterations of the channels may affect downstream wildlife and
vegetation. 238 Classifying intermittent and ephemeral streams as potential
point sources may protect against mobile pollutant discharge; however,
including those streams within the definition of navigable waters would
additionally promote the continuation of their water quality functions and
protect the wetlands adjacent to intermittent and ephemeral streams, which
likewise provide a wide range of water quality, wildlife, and flood control
functions. 239
It is not clear from the available scientific information that drawing the
federal jurisdictional line at relatively permanent flowing bodies is an
appropriate distinction when seeking "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. ' 240 Intermittent
and ephemeral streams are important to the purpose of the CWA both
because they comprise a large percentage of the nation's streams, and
because they provide valuable water quality services. 24 1 While exempting
these bodies from federal jurisdiction may not necessarily make the goal of
the CWA impossible, it would make the task much more difficult by
denying the Corps the opportunity to prevent the destruction of natural
mechanisms that improve water quality. 242 The western United States
would bear the brunt of this restriction since wide areas would be exempt
from federal jurisdiction as the climate cannot sustain year-round flows. 2 4 3
Ironically, the development made possible by the filling in of intermittent
streams might aid in the depletion of other streams through increased water
use, eventually turning those streams into intermittent channels so that they
too would fall outside of federal jurisdiction and could be developed. 244
Though other mechanisms have the potential to protect intermittent and
ephemeral streams, until such mechanisms are in place, inclusion under the
CWA may be required in order to achieve the statute's stated purpose.
While some states have enacted legislation aimed at preserving the quality
236. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2227 (2006) (noting that intermittent
streams that carry a pollutant downstream could be regulated as a point source).
237. See id. at 2263 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. See Reid & Ziemer, supra note 225.
239. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2245-48 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
240. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2000); see Kimberly Breedon, Comment, The Reach of Raich:
Implications for Legislative Amendments and Judicial Interpretations of the Clean Water
Act, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1441, 1474 (2006).
241. See Reid & Ziemer, supra note 225.
242. See May, supra note 7, at 140.
243. Elizabeth Shogren, Rule Drafted that Would Dilute the Clean Water Act, L.A.
Times, Nov. 6, 2003, at A12.
244. See Glennon & Maddock, supra note 125, at 568.
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of their waters, their effectiveness has been disputed. 245 Because the water
system connects all bodies of water, even those that seem exclusively local
may affect other areas. 246 For this reason, even if a state protects its own
streams, a neighboring state's failure to protect streams may have
significant effects on water quality within the first state. 247 In this type of
situation, where the benefits of an action (like filling a streambed) are
realized locally while the costs of the action are widespread (through loss of
filtering services), federal regulation may be especially appropriate. 248
Though weak interpretive rationale exists for implying a requirement of
relative permanence for classification as a navigable water, it may not be
able to sustain the bulk of evidence that indicates such a requirement would
undermine the broad purpose of the CWA. 249 Because other interpretations
of navigable waters are equally reasonable, a bright line standard, if
implemented, should not only adhere to, but also promote, the CWA goal of
clean healthy waters.
B. Continuous Surface Connection
The second requirement that the plurality advances as required for the
Corps' jurisdiction is a continuous surface connection between the water at
issue and a traditional navigable water. 250  Because Supreme Court
precedent from Riverside Bayview Homes established that wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters are themselves navigable waters,251 requiring a
continuous surface connection provides a bright line standard to determine
when a wetland is sufficiently adjacent. Though the plurality's test speaks
of a continuous surface connection to a traditionally navigable water, when
considered in conjunction with the first requirement, which excludes
intermittent and ephemeral streams, a surface connection with any
navigable water will also result in a continuous surface connection to a
traditionally navigable water.
Practically, the requirement of a continuous surface connection would
have two obvious implications. First, wetlands that do not abut navigable
waters but are separated by dry land, intermittent streams, or a man-made
245. See, e.g., Jason Thompson, Comment, Kansas Senate Bill 204, "The Dirty Water
Bill": Common Sense Water Policy or Violation of the Clean Water Act?, 51 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 905 (2003).
246. See Schmidt, supra note 120, at 117 (discussing the interconnectivity of the four-
state prairie pothole region).
247. See Philip M. Quatrochi, Comment, Groundwater Jurisdiction Under the Clean
Water Act: The Tributary Groundwater Dilemma, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 603, 642
(1996).
248. May, supra note 7, at 161.
249. See Thompson, supra note 245, at 921-22 (asserting that frequency of flow should
not be a determinative factor of jurisdiction in Kansas water protection law).
250. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2226 (2006). Some controversy exists,
however, about what constitutes surface water; for instance, Arizona includes subflow
besides the water flowing within the channel. Beck, supra note 125, at 677-78.
251. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985).
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structure252 would not be under the Corps' jurisdiction. 253  Second,
wetlands that are connected by groundwater to navigable waters, but not
surface water, would not be subject to the Corps' jurisdiction.254 A debate
is ongoing between lower federal courts as to whether groundwater offers a
sufficient connection to include wetlands as navigable waters. 255 Requiring
a continuous surface connection would settle that debate.
As with the relative permanence requirement, this section explores
arguments for and against adopting a continuous surface connection
requirement. The basic organization of the points of view, separated into
interpretive and scientific arguments, remains the same. Though many of
the general arguments advanced in Part II.A are equally applicable to the
continuous surface connection requirement, this section focuses on issues
more unique to the plurality's second requirement.
1. Why Require a Continuous Surface Connection?
The plurality chose the bright line standard of continuous surface
connection to resolve the confusion over whether a wetland should be
considered adjacent to navigable waters through any hydrological
connection.256 This section examines both the interpretive and scientific
arguments supporting this requirement.
a. Interpretive Arguments
With its requirement of continuous surface connection, the plurality
endeavored to interpret the meaning of adjacent within the holding of
Riverside Bayview Homes. While the word "adjacent" in this context
comes from Supreme Court precedent, the CWA, nevertheless, is important
to the proper discernment of its meaning because Riverside Bayview Homes
interpreted the statute. 257  In exploring the interpretive rationale for
requiring wetlands to have a continuous surface connection to navigable
waters, this section examines the text and structure of the CWA, precedent
on the issue, and the CWA's purpose and history.
252. The Carabell wetland was separated from the navigable water by a man-made
structure that prevented a surface connection between the two. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2219.
253. See id. at 2226 n.10 (limiting coverage to wetlands actually touching navigable
waters).
254. See id. at 2225-26.
255. Compare Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1180 (D. Idaho
2001) (extending jurisdiction to groundwater that is hydrologically connected to navigable
waters), with Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 272 (5th Cir. 2001) (requiring
evidence of direct and proximate causation of contamination of surface waters).
256. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2225.
257. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985).
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i. Text and Structure
From a purely textual viewpoint, wetlands are not explicitly included
within navigable waters under the CWA, and the word adjacent does not
appear in its text.258 Because the discussion regarding adjacency arose
through the Corps' regulations and Supreme Court rulings regarding those
regulations, textual analysis of the meaning of adjacency is discussed below
as one aspect of applicable precedent. 259
From a structural standpoint, Congress's failure to include groundwater
under § 404 of the CWA, while including it in other sections of the
statute, 260 implies that it was left out deliberately. 261 A surface connection
requirement for wetlands accords with Congress's intention to exempt
groundwater from federal jurisdiction under this provision of the CWA by
exempting those wetlands connected to navigable waters only through
groundwater.
Though the text and structure of the CWA provide implicit support for a
requirement of continuous surface connection, they offer very little
interpretive guidance. Because the adjacency requirement arises from
Riverside Bayview Homes, precedent provides additional insight.
ii. Precedent
The Justices have argued that no binding precedent exists for whether a
surface connection is required for federal jurisdiction over a particular body
of water.2 62 However, previous Supreme Court and lower court decisions
may imply such a requirement or persuade that it should exist. In Riverside
Bayview Homes, the Supreme Court held that the CWA "authorizes the
Corps to require landowners to obtain permits from the Corps before
discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of
water." 263 Though the decision did not define "adjacent," the wetland in
that case actually abutted a navigable water. 264 In general, adjacent means
"not distant" or "having a common endpoint or border. ' 265 "[A]djacent
may or may not imply contact but always implies absence of anything of
the same kind in between. '266
Riverside Bayview Homes emphasized the difficulty of delineating the
boundary of where a wetland stops and water begins.267 The emphasis on
258. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
259. See infra Part II.B. 1.a.ii.
260. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1254(a)(5), 1288(b)(2)(K).
261. See Quatrochi, supra note 247, at 608 n.48 (discussing differing state systems of
regulating groundwater as a reason for Congress to avoid regulating groundwater).
262. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2225-26 (2006) (distinguishing
Riverside Bayview Homes and SWANCC).
263. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985).
264. Id. at 131.
265. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 14 (10th ed. 1998).
266. Id.
267. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 132.
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the boundary drawing problem creates the implication that adjacency within
this context takes on the more stringent definition of adjacent-actually
touching or adjoined.268 More specifically, when dealing with wetlands and
navigable waters, a surface connection would be required.269 Tying in the
precedent of SWANCC, the "significant nexus" in Riverside Bayview
Homes was the wetland's adjacency, manifested by the surface
connection. 270
Taking the analysis one step further, SWANCC may be read to repudiate
jurisdiction based solely on the ecological functions served by wetlands. 271
In rejecting the Migratory Bird Rule, SWANCC found that the wetland
services provided to the birds did not constitute the "significant nexus"
required. 272 Similarly, the ponds in SWANCC were considered isolated
despite the fact that they were presumably connected to other bodies of
water through some manifestation of groundwater. 273  Read together,
Riverside Bayview Homes and SWANCC establish that a surface water
connection between wetlands and navigable waters allows jurisdiction,
while a groundwater connection does not. 274
Lower courts have also considered groundwater connections in
determining whether discharges into groundwater should be regulated under
the CWA.2 75 Though courts are nearly unanimous that any discharge that
can be traced to the surface of navigable waters can be regulated, the natural
seepage of water through the ground is not considered a discharge and is
therefore excluded from the Corps' jurisdiction.276 In this way, the focus
remains on surface water connections as providing the basis for jurisdiction
under the CWA.
The interpretive problem that the continuous surface connection
requirement endeavors to solve was born of Supreme Court precedent.
Accordingly, support for this solution to the question of adjacency may be
found within both Supreme Court and lower court precedent.
268. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2225 (2006).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 2226 (emphasis omitted).
271. Id.
272. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167-68 (2001).
273. See id. at 176 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing "hydrological" and
"ecological" connections of the "isolated" SWANCC ponds to navigable waters (emphasis
omitted)).
274. Knutsen, supra note 233, at 190.
275. See Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001); Quivira Mining
Co. v. U.S. EPA, 765 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1985); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F.
Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Idaho 2001); Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F.
Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1995); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D.
Ariz. 1975).
276. See, e.g., Friends of Santa Fe County, 892 F. Supp. at 1357-59.
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iii. Purpose and History
Effectuating the purpose of a statute is important in interpreting its
terms.277 At the same time, Congress does not intend to advance any
purpose at all costs. 278 The question becomes whether a requirement of a
continuous surface connection significantly aids or hampers the goal "to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters." 279  While regulating all wetlands might provide the
maximum benefit to water quality, aside from other constitutional concerns,
such an interpretation of the CWA would be extremely expensive and time
consuming. By excluding isolated wetlands from jurisdiction under the
CWA, a surface connection requirement focuses the Corps' attention and
resources on those bodies that are the most likely to have an impact on
overall water quality due to their obvious interconnection with other
bodies.280 Though fewer wetlands would be monitored, requiring a surface
connection would increase the efficiency and possibly the effectiveness of
the program.281
As for legislative history, Congress defeated a bill to amend the CWA to
include regulation of groundwater. 282 While the weight of such evidence of
intent should not be overemphasized, it is nonetheless relevant to show that
a refusal to extend jurisdiction to groundwater is, at the very least, not
inherently at odds with congressional intention. Further, the Corps
considered adopting a surface connection requirement when it considered a
Draft Rule in response to the SWANCC decision.283 Though not ultimately
adopted,284 its promulgation and consideration support the requirement's
legitimacy.
b. Scientific Arguments
As stated previously, requiring a continuous surface connection between
wetlands and navigable waters will facilitate the successful realization of
the CWA's purpose by focusing the Corps' resources on higher impact
areas.285  Though all the Earth's water is connected in one way or
277. See Mikva & Lane, supra note 130, at 164-65.
278. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapters of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 726
(1995) ("Deduction from the 'broad purpose' of a statute begs the question if it is used to
decide by what means (and hence to what length) Congress pursued that purpose; to get the
right answer to that question there is no substitute for the hard job. . . of reading the whole
text.").
279. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2000).
280. See Thompson, supra note 245, at 914 (asserting that a common sense approach to
water policy means using available resources where most needed).
281. See id. at 915.
282. Hayman, supra note 189, at 98-99.
283. See Verchick, supra note 6, at 872.
284. See id.
285. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
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another,286 it is necessary for practical reasons to draw a line at the kinds of
connections that the federal government will regulate. Though
geographically isolated wetlands may not be completely ecologically
isolated, wetlands with a surface connection to navigable water provide
clear evidence of their interconnectedness with the overall water system. 287
In this way, focusing federal regulation on the areas that have a proven and
observable connection to navigable waters maximizes the efficiency value
of a bright line approach.
Regulation of groundwater connections involves immensely complicated
considerations unique to each specific environment. 288 In some areas, the
point where water soaks into the ground and where the water eventually
surfaces "may vary from fractions of a mile to tens or hundreds of miles"
and take anywhere from "days to centuries or millennia" to get there.
289
Because regulations regarding groundwater are necessarily very location
specific and variable, broad-based federal regulation schemes are not
practical. 290 Even professionals in the field have been unable to propose
appropriate criteria to cover more than regional areas -of groundwater. 291
Due to the inherent complexity of regulating groundwater, the plurality's
surface connection requirement provides a bright line approach that
facilitates the purpose of the CWA by focusing the Corps' efforts on
wetlands that are more likely to have a direct impact on navigable waters.
2. Why Not Require a Continuous Surface Connection?
While requiring a continuous surface connection may have practical
appeal, it failed to gain majority support within the Supreme Court.292 This
section outlines the primary interpretive and scientific arguments against
adopting a requirement of continuous surface connection for wetlands
jurisdiction under the CWA.
a. Interpretive Arguments
In response to the plurality's interpretive arguments for adopting a
continuous surface connection requirement, this section explores arguments
against adoption of the plurality's second criterion, again through the text
and structure of the CWA, precedent on the issue, and the CWA's purpose
and history.
286. See Beck, supra note 125, at 675-76.
287. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2226 (2006) (rejecting reliance on
ecological factors to establish jurisdiction under the CWA).
288. Breedon, supra note 240, at 1472.
289. Hayman, supra note 189, at 123.
290. See id. at 126.
291. See id.
292. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2244 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2262 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 753326
THE BRIGHT LINE OF RAPANOS
i. Text and Structure
At its core, very little may be gleaned on the issue of adjacency from the
text of the CWA because the word does not appear.293 As with arguments
for requiring a continuous surface connection, textual arguments should
also be included in considering precedent on the issue.
While the CWA does not explicitly assert jurisdiction over groundwaters
in § 404, neither does it explicitly reject jurisdiction over wetlands
connected to navigable waters through groundwaters. 294  Though
proponents of the requirement may point to the structure of the CWA as
evidence of congressional intent to exclude groundwaters, 295 this argument
applies only to direct regulation of groundwaters. The question of
jurisdiction over wetlands connected to navigable waters through
groundwater is more complicated. Because regulation of wetlands
connected through groundwaters does not as clearly implicate the problems
of differing state treatment of groundwaters, extending the implication in
this circumstance may be unwarranted.296
ii. Precedent
The precedent that supports a continuous surface connection requirement
may not reflect the entire precedential picture. Riverside Bayview Homes
established the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to navigable
waters. 297 The first entry of the dictionary definition of adjacent reads "not
distant: nearby." 298 While adjacent may refer to things that touch one
another, actual adjoinment is not required by the most common definition
of adjacent. 299 In Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court considered the
constitutionality of the Corps' regulation asserting jurisdiction over
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.300 A passage from the Federal
Register quoted by the Court mandated inclusion of "adjacent wetlands that
form the border of or are in reasonable proximity to other waters of the
United States." 301 Though the facts of the case only required the Court to
make a holding about wetlands that abut navigable waters, it noted the
Corps' definition of adjacent in its unanimous opinion.302 The Court also
noted that jurisdiction would be proper even if the wetland did not "hav[e]
its source in adjacent bodies of open water." 30 3 Though not specifically
293. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
294. See id. § 1344(a).
295. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
296. See Quatrochi, supra note 247, at 642 (arguing that differing state approaches should
not prevent jurisdiction directly over tributary groundwater).
297. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985).
298. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, supra note 265, at 14.
299. Id.
300. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 123.





identifying this hypothetical situation as one lacking a surface connection,
the description strongly implies that such a characterization would fit.304
While this discussion does not create binding precedent, because it was not
necessary to the disposition of the case, it nonetheless provides support for
at least the possibility of covering wetlands that did not have a surface
connection with navigable water. Similarly, because the discussion
regarding boundary drawing may also be seen as dicta, opponents of a
surface connection requirement would likely argue that the discussion
merely commented on the facts of the case and did not provide binding
legal rationale.
Opponents of a surface connection requirement would also likely
distinguish SWANCC. Because that case dealt with isolated waters and not
adjacent or questionably adjacent wetlands,30 5 its holding should have little
impact on the outcome of Rapanos and similar cases. Jurisdiction in that
case did not rest on a groundwater connection, but on the Corps' Migratory
Bird Rule.306 Even if a groundwater connection were rejected in that case,
it may be distinguishable because the question at hand would not be
whether the ponds were adjacent to navigable waters; the Corps would have
had to rely on a different basis for jurisdiction because the adjacent
precedent applies only to wetlands.307
As for lower court rulings, though the majority of courts do not allow
jurisdiction over groundwater contamination due to natural seepage, they do
grant jurisdiction over groundwater when a pollutant discharged there
reaches the surface of navigable waters. 308 In this way, the courts are able
to balance the difficulty of regulating groundwater while allowing
jurisdiction when it is apparent that water quality is being harmed. Justice
Scalia touched on this line of precedent in the plurality opinion in Rapanos
when he argued that the relative permanence requirement would not harm
enforcement because intermittent streams could be regulated as point
sources. 309 Should the plurality's second criterion be adopted, it may
undermine at least one of its arguments in support of the first criterion by
excluding any discharges that are not transferred through surface waters,
but through groundwaters from intermittent streams to navigable waters.
iii. Purpose and History
At the heart of any argument in support of requiring a continuous surface
connection is the assumption that the wetlands exhibiting those connections
304. See id.
305. See SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 163-64 (2001).
306. Id. at 164.
307. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7) (2006).
308. See, e.g., Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001); Friends of
Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1995).
309. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2227 (2006).
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will be those that have the greatest impact on overall water quality. 310 If
this is not the case, the purpose of the CWA will not be served by this
requirement. 311 Under this bright line standard, a small wetland with a
surface connection to navigable waters would be subject to the Corps'
jurisdiction while a larger wetland with no surface connection would be
excluded even if it could be shown that it has a greater impact on water
quality than the first. 312 When aimed at promoting the purpose of the
CWA, this bright line approach can thus be seen as potentially arbitrary. 313
As discussed previously, Congress failed to act to rein in the Corps'
jurisdiction when enacting amendments to the CWA in 1977.314 Likewise,
neither Congress nor the Corps have taken restrictive action in the thirty
years that the Corps' regulations have been in place, or in the twenty years
since the Riverside Bayview Homes decision. Though not as authoritative
as positive action, a long period of legislative and administrative acceptance
of a technical regulation should caution courts from interfering. 315
Especially considering that enforcement has been consistent through both
Democratic and Republican administrations, CWA jurisdiction should not
be conceived of as a partisan issue in need of protection. 316 Though in
responding to SWANCC the Corps considered utilizing a surface connection
requirement, this provision was heavily criticized and ultimately rejected.3 17
From an interpretive standpoint, a continuous surface connection
requirement is not required by the text or structure of the CWA, and may
contradict the balance of precedent on the issue. The next section delves
more deeply into the scientific questions underlying the purpose of the
CWA.
b. Scientific Arguments
While charting the progress or contamination of groundwaters involves
highly complex considerations, much less controversy surrounds the idea
that all water is ultimately connected within the water cycle.318 Because the
CWA aims at broad water quality control, no bright line standard should be
310. This assumption is not uncontroversial. See Schmidt, supra note 120, at 112-13 ("It
is often the case that groundwater exerts a far greater influence on the 'chemical, physical,
and biological integrity' of the Nation's waters than surface waters." (citation omitted)).
311. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2246 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
312. See id.
313. See Breedon, supra note 240, at 1474.
314. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 136 (1985).
315. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2247 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2263 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
316. See Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of William W. Buzbee, Professor, Emory
Law School).
317. See Verchick, supra note 6, at 872-73.
318. See Gordon H. Howard, Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers: Navigable Waters and
Small Handles in the Dry, Dry Desert, 35 Envtl. L. 605, 626 (2005); Hayman, supra note
189, at 124; Beck, supra note 125, at 675-76.
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employed that would undermine or fail to promote its purpose. 319 Like
intermittent and ephemeral streams, wetlands provide invaluable water
quality functions, including trapping sediment to prevent it from degrading
downstream habitat.320 Wetlands filter and restore water quality, providing
similar functions as expensive water treatment plants.32 1 Wetlands also
protect against the harms of flooding by providing extra storage of water up
to their capacity. 322 Conversely, the storage functions of wetlands mitigate
the harmful effects of droughts by naturally storing moisture until
needed. 323  Both the flood and drought management services benefit
wildlife populations as well. 324  Because the processes provided by
wetlands depend on the water not immediately being washed downstream,
wetlands that do not share a surface connection with moving water may
actually be able to provide ecological services on a greater scale than those
that do directly abut navigable waters. 325 Since "isolated" wetlands may
provide an equal or superior benefit to overall water quality, their exclusion
from federal jurisdiction due to a requirement of continuous surface
connection could hinder the realization of the purpose of the CWA. 326
The water quality benefits of even isolated wetlands are immense. The
services they provide are so important that "[a]ttempts to protect the quality
of surface waters may prove fruitless if contaminated tributary
groundwaters [are allowed to] pollute surface waters. ' 327 In this way,
requiring surface connections may go further than being arbitrary in light of
the purpose of the CWA and actually undermine it.32 8
One study has delineated 276 types of wetlands, 29% of which are
considered isolated. 329 Though nearly universally "support[ing] high levels
of biodiversity, '330 wetlands are not easily categorized, and "geographic,
ecologic, and hydrologic isolation can be described at multiple spatial and
temporal scales." 331  Even within a single region, multiple types of
wetlands coexist.332 Unfortunately, approximately half of the nation's
original wetlands no longer exist.333 Because the functioning of wetlands
319. See Schmidt, supra note 120, at 110 ("It is unlikely that Congress intentionally
enacted the most 'comprehensive' water pollution control in American history, but
simultaneously limited the Act's regulatory authority to surface water only.").
320. See May, supra note 7, at 129.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 131; Schmidt, supra note 120, at 97.
323. See Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Chuck Clayton, Immediate Past President,
The Izaak Walton League of America).
324. See id.; May, supra note 7, at 132.
325. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2245-46 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
326. See Schmidt, supra note 120, at 110.
327. Quatrochi, supra note 247, at 604.
328. See May, supra note 7, at 132-33; Breedon, supra note 240, at 1474.
329. See Comer, supra note 2, at 1.
330. Id. at 1, 4.
331. Id. at 4; see also Stokstad, supra note 14, at 1870.
332. See Comer, supra note 2, at 18-20.
333. See Knutsen, supra note 233, at 156.
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and groundwater are so complex, technical experts, such as those with the
Corps, should make decisions regarding where the bright line of adjacency
should lie.334 Thus far, the Corps has not focused on surface waters of
wetlands, and instead relies on the saturation of soil and appropriate
vegetation to define wetlands. 335 With such a large portion of wetlands at
stake, should this requirement be more broadly adopted, it could have
significant negative impact on water quality.336
One area of the country that has garnered much of the attention of this
debate is the prairie pothole region of the Great Plains. 337 Though the area
features a great number of "isolated" wetlands that have no surface
connection between them, it is believed that the entire region is
hydrologically connected.338 Because this area is large and stretches across
multiple states, the loss of federal protection for these lands through the
CWA could be devastating. Similarly, states and local governments often
buckle to political pressure not to protect wetlands situated entirely within
an individual's property either because of property right interests or because
of fear that stifling development will have a negative effect on the
economy. 339 Federal regulation is particularly appropriate where benefits
of an action are experienced locally, while the costs may be transferred
downstream, likely across state lines.340
Like intermittent and ephemeral streams, effective protection of wetlands
cannot be limited to detecting mobile pollutants. These bodies must be
protected because of their ability to filter out pollutants already in the
water. 341 Filling wetlands may have significant effects on overall water
quality regardless of whether or not a surface connection exists with a
navigable water.342 For this reason, science indicates that the adjacency
requirement would undermine protection of wetlands. 343
III. THE PLURALITY'S BRIGHT LINE TEST SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED
While the current status of requiring case-by-case determinations for the
Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA is not ideal and would be improved by
adoption of clearer standards, the standards outlined by the plurality in
334. See Breedon, supra note 240, at 1473.
335. See Schmidt, supra note 120, at 98.
336. See Lee, supra note 179, at 289 (noting that the more wetlands left out of federal
jurisdiction, the greater effect on water quality).
337. See Schmidt, supra note 120, at 116.
338. Id.
339. See May, supra note 7, at 137-38.
340. See id.; Quatrochi, supra note 247, at 642 (discussing several commentators'
argument that groundwater pollution control should be left to the states).
341. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
342. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2245 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
343. See Delay Could Give EPA Time to Win Support for Dual Water Test, supra note
118, at 2 ("The Scalia opinion is extraordinarily wrong from a scientific position." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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Rapanos should not be adopted. The text, structure, and precedent of the
CWA require neither relative permanence in a regulated body of water nor a
continuous surface connection between wetlands and navigable waters. 344
Based on the available scientific information about water systems, drawing
the jurisdictional line as the plurality does is arbitrary and may undermine
the ultimate purpose of the CWA. 345 With such important national interests
at stake, this limitation of the CWA should not be adopted by Congress, the
Corps, or the courts.
A. Inconclusive Interpretation
Though each of the plurality's two criteria can be colorably supported
through the text, structure, and precedent of the CWA, arguments against
both criteria are equally reasonable. 346 Because the language of the statute
is highly ambiguous, many reasonable interpretive arguments may be
advanced.347 Reasonable interpretations argue both for and against the
plurality's requirements; 348 therefore, the text, structure, and precedent do
not require the adoption of one view over the other. In such instances, the
purpose of the statute, the history of its agency interpretation, and its
efficiency values may be taken into account to tip favor in one direction or
the other.
Because this argument is about interpretation of the statute, it does not
apply equally to Congress, the Corps, and the courts. While the Corps and
the courts seek to interpret statutes faithfully, Congress has the power to
take statutes in new directions through amendments or subsequent
enactments. 349  However, in no circumstance does the current text,
structure, and precedent of the CWA mandate a particular stance regarding
the criteria advanced by the plurality in Rapanos. In determining how to
act toward these criteria, governmental actors should carefully consider the
purpose of the statute: "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters. 35 ° With this focus in mind,
more restrictive textual interpretations appear less reasonable.
344. See supra Part II.A.2.a.i-ii; supra Part II.B.2.a.i-ii.
345. See supra Part II.A.2.b; supra Part II.B.2.b.
346. Compare supra Part II.A.1, with supra Part II.A.2; compare supra Part II.B.1, with
supra Part II.B.2.
347. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985)
(discussing the reasonableness of the Corps' interpretation of the CWA over other
interpretive arguments).
348. Compare supra Part II.A. 1, with supra Part II.A.2; compare supra Part II.B. 1, with
supra Part II.B.2.
349. See Breedon, supra note 240, at 1474 (discussing Congress's ability to overrule
court interpretations).
350. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2000).
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B. Arbitrary Standards
The criteria adopted by the plurality were not advanced by any of the
parties to Rapanos.351 Instead, the plurality combined points from amicus
briefs to craft what it considered to be a reasonable bright line standard in
accordance with the text and structure of the CWA. 3 52  While the
interpretive analysis may be reasonable, and the preference for a clear
standard wise, the effect of the chosen criteria on the statute's purpose and
enforcement counsels against adopting the proposed standards. In this
respect, the plurality's criteria fail.
A consensus exists around the fact that having clear standards to
delineate federal jurisdiction under the CWA is preferable to a case-by-case
approach. 353 Though presented as bright line standards, the plurality's
criteria may not live up to that description. In regards to requiring a
permanent presence of water flow, the plurality takes a somewhat
indeterminate stance toward intermittent streams, allowing jurisdiction over
seasonal streams, but not others. 354 Particularly troubling when looking for
a clear standard is the plurality's appeal to common sense when
"distinguish[ing] between a wash and seasonal river." 355  Likewise, in
regards to the continuous surface connection between wetlands and
navigable waters needed to establish adjacency, it is not entirely clear how
significant of a connection would suffice or what makes a connection a
surface connection. 356 Standards are certainly not expected to remove all
controversy over jurisdiction; however, if such standards create new
controversy or fail to settle existing controversy, their efficiency value
diminishes.
Should the criteria be judged sufficiently clear to provide helpful bright
line standards, they should still make logical and scientific sense with
regards to the purpose of the statute. The plurality's criteria fail in this
regard. 357 Neither the permanence of water flow nor the continuity of
surface connection between wetlands and navigable waters is a reliable
indicator of the extent to which a certain body affects water quality. 358
While determining these effects involves complex, highly scientific
questions, a simplified proxy should not be adopted if it does not adequately
track the measurements desired. Both intermittent and ephemeral streams
and geographically isolated wetlands provide water quality services that are
not taken into account by the plurality's criteria.359 Furthermore, the
351. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
354. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2221 n.5 (2006).
355. Id.
356. See supra note 250.
357. See Delay Could Give EPA Time to Win Court Support for Dual Water Test, supra
note 118, at 2.
358. See supra Part II.A.2.b; supra Part II.B.2.b.
359. See supra Part II.A.2.b; supra Part II.B.2.b.
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positive effects of these bodies may in certain circumstances have a greater
effect than bodies that would be included by the criteria.
C. Affecting the CWA's Purpose
Because the criteria advanced by the plurality is arbitrary in relation to
"restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters," 360 broad adoption of this test would not
facilitate the realization of the CWA's purpose. In particular, adopting the
plurality's test would have a disproportionate effect on the southwestern
region of the United States36 1 and areas like the prairie pothole region 362
that depend on federal regulation to protect the diverse and important
functions performed by the local bodies of water.
Further, though regulation of the affecting bodies may be handled at the
state level, adopting the plurality's criteria for federal jurisdiction may
actually undermine those efforts. From a political standpoint, it may be
harder to introduce or garner support for protecting bodies that the federal
government exempts from its regulation; the exemption may create the
perception that those bodies are too insignificant to warrant protection. 363
Indeed, many states base their conservation programs on federal
guidelines. 364 Additionally, restricting federal jurisdiction as the plurality
suggests might actually create less incentive for states to initiate
conservation programs because the benefits of such plans are often not
localized within a state while the burden of the land restriction is entirely
within the state. Even when states do accurately gauge the importance of
bodies of water, their efforts at conservation may be undermined by
neighboring states' failure to protect their resources. Such a situation might
operate as a disincentive to states acting unilaterally to protect their
intermittent streams and isolated wetlands.
In a similar way, adoption of the plurality's test may not merely fail to
facilitate, but may actually undermine the realization of the CWA's
purpose. Failure to regulate bodies that have a significant impact on the
nation's water quality may render the Corps' ongoing efforts fruitless
because of a constant stream of pollutants flowing from unregulated waters,
or because development of beneficial areas has left the water system
without its natural ability to filter and purify. Any bright line test that is
likely to undermine the purpose of a statute should not be broadly adopted.
360. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
361. See Shogren, supra note 243.
362. See Schmidt, supra note 120, at 116.
363. See States Fear Increased Wetlands Workload in Wake of Rapanos Ruling, Envtl.
Pol'y Alert (Inside Wash. Publishers, Arlington, Va.), Sept. 27, 2006, at 1, 1.
364. See id.
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CONCLUSION
Despite the plurality's good intentions in advancing a bright line test to
address federal jurisdiction under the CWA, the arguments favoring broad
adoption of the criteria advanced do not overcome those in opposition.
While case-by-case determinations are not ideal for establishing
jurisdiction, they should continue until a bright line approach can be agreed
upon that promotes the purpose of the CWA. Because this type of scientific
question is best answered by the Corps, or through congressional hearings,
the courts should continue to utilize Justice Kennedy's significant nexus
test while urging action from Congress or the Corps.
Notes & Observations
